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Abstract-Based on fieldwork in Yugoslavia and China. we compare medicine in two societies which are 
attempting to construct their own unique paths to socialism. After a brief description of each country 
and its sociopolitical system, we sketch the broad outlines of the health care system which has evolved. 
We then discuss certain constraints on achieving the socialist objectives of equality of access to health 
care and democratization of the patient-clinician relationship. In a concluding section, we summarize 
some of the similarities and differences in medicine under Yugoslav and Chinese socialism, respectively. 
INTRODUCTION 
Although twentieth-century socialist revolutions have 
aroused much suspicion and, indeed, open hostility, 
they have also inspired hope among the world’s 
disadvantaged and those who. speak in their behalf. 
Among other things, socialism offers the promise of a 
more equitable distribution of goods and services, a 
promise which has often been realized, for example, in 
dramatically improved health delivery and health 
status. 
There are few who would not be sympathetic to 
socialist objectives in the area of health, and encour- 
aged by the progress which has been made in several 
countries of ‘actually existing socialism’ [l]. We 
would, however. take issue with such proponents of 
socialist medicine as Sigerist [2] and Navarro [3] 
who have rejected one set of intellectual blinders only 
to have substituted equally distorting lenses which 
focus most clearly on Potemkin villages. Likewise we 
would urge caution in drawing sharp distinctions 
between ‘medicine under capitalism’ and ‘medicine 
under socialism’ [4]. Such superficial reports and 
rigid dichotomies tend to obscure variations among 
socialist and among capitalist societies. as well as 
similarities between them. Thus, comparisons and 
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evaluations of socialist and capitalist medicine seem 
to us premature without more careful and informed 
case studies, especially on ‘medicine under socialism’. 
The present paper is intended as a contribution to 
this end. Based on extended fieldwork in the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the People’s 
Republic of China, we report on two aspects of medi- 
cal care: access to care and the patient-clinician re- 
lationship. As Waitzkin and Waterman [S] stress, 
access to medical care and the doctor-patient re- 
lationship are generally stratified in capitalist society. 
On the one hand, different segments of the society 
have differential access to care. On the other hand, 
based on differential access to medical information, 
the doctor-patient relationship is characteristically 
hierarchical. Given claims that such stratification can 
be transcended under socialism, these would seem im- 
portant areas to explore in societies which have ex- 
perienced a socialist revolution. 
Before turning to our case studies of Yugoslav and 
Chinese medicine, a comment on the approach we 
take is in order. In framing our description and analy- 
sis. we have been guided by a recent attempt by Rieker 
and Begun [6] to posit a ‘social model of the illness 
process’. While intended as a model for organizing 
and teaching social science knowledge in medical 
schools, it also provides a useful framework for 
understanding how macro- and microsocial factors 
influence medical practice. As Rieker and Begun sug- 
gest, a distinctly social analysis of medical practice 
must take account of the wider social context (e.g. 
legal. political and economic institutions; health ser- 
vice organization) as well as social positions occupied 
by patients and clinicians (e.g. age, sex, occupation, 
class, geographic location). Applied to our present 
concerns. this model directs our attention first to the 
larger contexts of Yugoslav and Chinese socialism, 
and to the ways these societies have chosen to allo- 
cate and organize health resources. Once these mac- 
rosocial factors have been described, we can then 
examine access to care and the patientxlinician re- 
lationship in each society. It is at this point that we 
consider the influence of relevant patient and clinician 
social positions. 
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YUGOSLAVIA 
The sociopfdificrrl conrexf: self-managing sociulism 
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is a 
country of 22 million people located in the Balkan 
peninsula of southeast Europe. It is composed of six 
republics (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, 
Montenegro. Serbia and Slovenia) and two auton- 
omous provinces which form part of Serbia (Kosovo 
and Vojvodina). The country is further divided into 
over 500 communes (comparable to districts or coun- 
ties), With an average population of around 42,000. 
the commune represents the basic unit of local 
government [-il. 
As a union of several South Slav national groups 
with different cultural heritages. religions, languages 
and alphabets and at different levels of social and 
economic development, socialist Yugoslavia emerged 
during the Second World War through a communist- 
inspired national liberation struggle led by Josip Broz 
Tito. Notwithstanding persisting interregional vari- 
ations in development. Tito’s Yugoslavia has proven 
more successful than the pre-war monarchy in unify- 
ing these diverse groups. In large measure, this can be 
attributed to the unique form of sociopolitical and 
economic organization which has evolved under the 
general rubric of se/fmanuging socialism. After break- 
ing with the Soviet Union in 1948, Yugoslavia gradu- 
ally moved from a highly centralized system of 
government and state planning to a much more de- 
centralized arrangement giving greater formal de- 
cision-making power to the republics and communes 
(socid selfgouernmenr). Enterprises have gained con- 
siderable autonomy and are managed by workers 
themselves with decreasing state interference and 
increasing reliance on the market (worker se/fmunuge- 
menr). Although the state [S] and political elites can 
and do intervene in guiding overall development of 
the country and influencing decision-making at all 
levels, there has been a genuine increase in the range 
of issues which are dealt with through direct negotia- 
tion among interested individuals and groups. 
Furthermore, opportunities for workers and citizens 
to participate in decision-making in their places of 
work and residence have expanded through creation 
of numerous participatory institutions (e.g. workers’ 
councils, tenant councils, assemblies of users and pro- 
viders of social services). 
As measured by various indicators of economic and 
social development, Yugoslavia has made consider- 
able progress. It has had one of the highest economic 
growth rates in the world. Per cupita income in cur- 
rent prices increased from less than $100 at the war’s 
end to over $2000 in 1977 [9, lo]. Given the emphasis 
placed on industrialization and urbanization, the 
agrarian population declined from 63”,, in 1948 to 
38”, in 1971. With improvements in general standard 
of living, hygiene and medical care delivery. infant 
deaths per 1000 live births declined from over 116 in 
1953 to 35 in 1977 (see Table 1 for selected resource, 
health services and health status mdicators for Yugo- 
slavia and China). However. as we have already sug- 
gested, the fruits of this progress are still spread un- 
equally so that infant mortality, for example. ranges 
from 17 ,in the most developed republic (Slovenia) to 
over 73 in the least developed province (Kosovo) 
[7. 111. 
These trends in the larger sociopolitical context 
have affected the organization and financing of health 
services in Yugoslavia. As in other socialist societies, 
health protection was immediately defined as a right 
and collective responsibility. Within limits set by the 
country’s underdevelopment and priority given to 
industrialization, the new regime set about rebuilding 
and expanding the supply of health facilities and per- 
sonnel decimated by the war. The number of hospital 
beds increased from less than 61.000 in 1952 to 
130,000 in 1977, while the number of physicians rose 
from around 6200 to over 28.000 in the same period 
[ 12, 131. Furthermore. health institutions were nat- 
ionalized, with highly centralized administration and 
financing through social insurance contributions. 
Health workers became state employees. although 
physicians were initially permitted to practice pri- 
vately after their regular working hours. 
With moves towards decentralization and the evo- 
lution of self-managing socialism since the 1950s a 
rather different system has emerged. Under policy 
guidelines set at the republic or federal level, the com- 
munes have the major responsibility for organizing 
and financing health services primarily through local- 
ly-derived and administered, mandatory health insur- 
ance contributions [ 141. Health facilities are relatively 
autonomous ris-ti-uis the state and have the status of 
socially-owned institutions managed (self-managed) 
by their employees and community representatives. 
Health workers are no longer state employees and are 
free to seek positions as they become available and 
are advertised. Remaining legalized private practice 
(involving less than I”,, of all physicians and dentists) 
is scheduled to be phased out by 1985 [15, 161. 
For the Yugoslav who seeks medical care. the usual 
point of entry is the local health center. Staffed by 
general practitioners, dentists, nurses, laboratory 
workers and a limited number of specialists, the 
health center provides most outpatient care for resi- 
dents in one or more communes, and integrates cura- 
tive, preventive, educational and certain epidemiologi- 
Table I. Resources, health services and health status indicators for SFR Yugoslavia and PR China. 1977 
GNP 
Area per Physicians Hospital beds Infant 
Population IOOO mortality Life expectancy 
(loo01 km2 
capita per lOO.OOO per IOOOOO 
US $ population population rate* at birth 
SFR Yugoslavia 21,775 256 2094 131 603 35 69 
PR China 987,406 9597 378 33 185 65 64 
*Infant mortality rates are the death rates of infants under I year of age per 1000 live births. Source: [lo]. 
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cal services for its territory. The center is composed of 
general practice clinics dispersed throughout the com- 
mune, as well as separate clinics for industrial [17], 
school, and maternal and child health care, each with 
its own staff of appropriate specialists. For outlying 
rural areas, the health center often has branch 
stations with a full-time nurse or nurse-midwife and 
part-time physician. 
For more specialized consultations and treatment 
on an outpatient basis, the general practitioner or 
other health center clinics make referrals to a polycli- 
nic attached to a general hospital and staffed with a 
wide range of specialists and subspecialists. The 
patient normally returns to the local health center for 
prescriptions or hospital referral. As in most countries 
with a national health program, inpatient care is pro- 
vided by full-time staffs in a relatively small number 
of large general and specialized hospitals. 
To minimize expensive and unnecessary duplica- 
tion of services, attempts have been made to integrate 
and coordinate the work of health institutions in a 
commune or over larger areas. On the one hand, 
there has been a tendency since the late 1950s for the 
health center, polyclinic and general hospital in a 
given commune to merge to form a medical center. 
On the other hand. there are efforts to coordinate the 
development of highly specialized services in a 
network of regional and republic-level hospitals, a 
goal, however, which often comes in conflict with the 
aspirations of autonomous local institutions. 
Each of these individual health institutions is self- 
managed and self-financed. Employees of health insti- 
tutions (like those of all socialized Yugoslav work or- 
ganizations) participate in the management of their 
workplaces directly as members of the assembly of 
workers (all employees) and indirectly through their 
elected delegates in the workers’ council. These self- 
management bodies decide on the organization of 
work. hiring and firing, allocations of revenues and 
setting of pay scales. while day-to-day administration 
is left to the institution’s director (usually a physician) 
and management board. To ensure representation of 
broader social interests. community delegates are in- 
cluded in self-management bodies. Nevertheless, 
health professionals retain a large measure of control 
over local institutions given their numerical advan- 
tage in these bodies and the tendency for community 
members to defer to professional expertise. 
In contrast to China where considerable funding 
comes from the state budget. Yugoslav health insti- 
tutions are largely self-financing. Not unlike various 
prepaid group practices in the United States, most 
health care costs and a portion of capital expenditures 
are financed through annual contracts negotiated 
prospectively with local health insurance associations. 
Other sources of funds include contracts with local 
work organizations for providing specific services to 
their employees. direct patient fees and government 
payments for certain groups (e.g. veterans, the indi- 
gent). On the basis of referenda, residents in one or 
more communes may also agree to make contri- 
butions for specific capital expansion projects. 
Self-managing socialism has also shaped the organ- 
ization of the local insurance associations. At one 
time part of the state administration, they are now 
autonomous organizations self-managed by assemb- 
lies composed of users and providers of services in a 
given commune. With the aid of a professional staff of 
administrators, the assembly is responsible for health 
planning and programming in the commune, nego- 
tiates contracts with provider institutions and decides 
on the rate of contributions to be collected as a pay- 
roll deduction from those employed in the socialized 
sector or as a tax or per capita payment from private 
farmers. craft workers and free professionals (e.g. 
writers, artists) [18]. Republic laws mandate a basic 
level of rights and benefits which must be insured, 
although local associations may opt for more compre- 
hensive coverage provided they agree to collect the 
necessary funds. Republic-level ‘solidarity funds’ assist 
communes unable to afford the basic level of services. 
Gaining access to care 
According to the Yugoslav Constitution, “everyone 
shall be entitled to health care” [19]. However in 
Yugoslavia (as in all other societies) this goal remains 
somewhat elusive. Although the country’s commit- 
ment to national health insurance and to increasing 
the supply and improving the distribution of health 
personnel and facilities has made health care more 
accessible to the population, there are still financial 
and organizational barriers to obtaining care, in gen- 
eral, and higher quality care, in particular. Socialist 
aspirations to the contrary, there continues to be dif- 
ferential access to care depending on the specific 
‘location’ of the sick person in the social structure of 
Yugoslav society. 
In this regard, decentralization of health adminis- 
tration and financing has had direct consequences for 
the problem of accessibility. While it can permit a 
closer fit between health service delivery and local 
needs and greater participation of users and providers 
in health care decision-making, there have been trade- 
offs in the form of persisting inequalities in the 
availability and development of health services given 
the country’s uneven economic development. Despite 
redistribution of a portion of locally-derived health 
monies via the solidarity funds, residents in wealthier 
and usually urban areas have easier access to higher 
quality care than do their counterparts in the poorer, 
mostly rural areas. Under such a decentralized ar- 
rangement, wealthier communes can generate a larger 
pool of health funds from which to finance more com- 
prehensive care and more modern and better- 
equipped and staffed facilities. 
Accessibility of care does not only depend on 
whether one lives in a more or less prosperous com- 
mune. Another factor is employment status. With 
industrialization as one of socialist Yugoslavia’s key 
development objectives, greater priority has been 
given to providing mandatory health insurance cover- 
age as well as special facilities (industrial outpatient 
‘clinics) for workers in the socialized sector. It was 
only after the late 1950s that health insurance was 
extended to farmers (who have remained largely in 
the private sector) and to others privately employed 
(craft workers, professionals, private restaurant and 
hotel owners. etc.). Even then, benefits provided with- 
out payment at the point of delivery have usually 
been more comprehensive for those covered under 
workers’ insurance with corresponding implications 
for easier access to care. However, the tendency 
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towards equalization of benefits for workers and 
farmers during the 1970s is beginning to erase some of 
the differences in accessibility to care related solely to 
employment status. 
Finally, ease of access is limited by what is com- 
monly referred to as ‘bureaucracy’. As in all societies 
with a national health program. there are certain for- 
mal procedures governing where and how a sick per- 
son obtains care. To illustrate. although a sick person 
in Yugoslavia is not necessarily assigned to a specific 
general practitioner, he/she is still required to have a 
referral ticket from the GP to obtain specialist care. 
Or, to keep health funds within the commune, insur- 
ance associations have made it more difficult for their 
beneficiaries to seek care outside the local service area 
(e.g. by requiring signatures from three physicians 
rather than one for referral outside the commune with 
full reimbursement). It should nevertheless be noted 
that various informal means are at times used to by- 
pass such bureaucratic barriers and therefore enhance 
the accessibility of care. For example, it is not that 
uncommon for a Party member or someone else with 
‘connections’ to obtain care wherever and whenever 
he or she chooses. Similarly, although illegal, bribes in 
the form of money or gifts may also give certain 
Yugoslavs an advantage over others in getting care. 
The putient-clinicicm relutionshp 
Finally, we shall note a few features of the patient- 
clinician relationship in the Yugoslav setting. In con- 
trast to the Soviet Union and China, Yugoslavia has 
not attempted to train physician-substitutes or 
extenders, so that the important clinician to consider 
is the physician. While decentralization and self- 
management have to some extent democratized de- 
cision-making between users and providers of services 
concerning health policy and planning issues. the re- 
lationship between patient and physician is still 
largely hierarchical. Patients continue to defer to the 
‘professional mystique’ of physicians who have 
retained considerable prestige in Yugoslav society, 
notwithstanding low personal incomes relative to 
physicians in many capitalist societies or occasional 
campaigns to equalize their status with other workers 
1203. Disproportionate recruitment into medical 
school of children of experts, managers and adminis- 
trators only serves to reinforce this pattern [21]. 
However, this is not to say that the clinicians are in 
complete control in face-to-face interaction with 
patients. For one thing, the organization and linanc- 
ing of health care place certain limits on what is poss- 
ible. For example, to control costs, some communal 
insurace associations have attempted to restrict drugs 
which are covered by insurance funds, with definite 
implications for physicians’ prescribing habits. 
Patients as well are not entirely without bargaining 
power in the patient-clinician encounter. Thus, with a 
crowded waiting room of patients. it may be the 
easiest course of action for the physician to give in to 
patient demands for sick leave certification or special- 
ist exams. In addition, the use of bribes and connec- 
tions also tends to shape the clinicians’ decisions 
apart from purely medical criteria. 
At this point, we would make one further comment 
on the patient-clinician relationship in Yugoslavia. In 
our discussion thus far, we have interpreted the giving 
of money or gifts to clinicians as ‘bribes’. as some- 
thing given by a patient to persuade or induce the 
clinician to do something the patient desires or simply 
as a means to get around the ‘svstem’ more easily. 
However, based on our observatrons in Yugoslavia. 
they can also serve the function of a gratuity; that is. 
something given without claim or demand on the part 
of the patient. Thus, despite the fact that their care 
was covered by health insurance. it was not uncom- 
mon for patients to give something to physicians or 
other health workers out of gratitude for services pro- 
vided. Whether this reflects some sort of underlying 
principle of reciprocity in the patient-clinician re- 
lationship or merely another way to insure against 
future health needs is something which requires 
further study. 
CHIN4 
The sociopolitid conte.Yt: democrntic~ c~mtrtrlism 
The Chinese revolution of 1949 brought unity and 
stability to a country torn by over a decade of war 
with Japan and 4 years of civil war between National- 
ist and Communist forces. It also marked the culmin- 
ation of a century of foreign aggression and internal 
conflict. The success of the peasant revolution prom- 
ised radical improvement in the health and material 
condition of a population. devastated by war. famine 
and economic disaster. 
The subsequent three decades have shown continu- 
ous, if occasionally erratic, economic and social devel- 
opment. Per capita income has risen from consider- 
ably below $100 in the first half of the century [22] to 
$378 in 1977 [lo], although as in Yugoslavia. the pace 
of development has varied among different regions 
and between urban and rural areas. Improvements in 
the quality of life have included the eradication or 
substantial control of most communicable diseases 
[23] and a reported drop in infant mortality from 
over 200 per 1000 live births in 1949 [24] to approx. 
65 in 1977 [lo] (see Table 1). Furthermore, a complex 
referral system which reaches into the smallest villages 
has greatly enhanced the accessibility of health ser- 
vices. In contrast to Yugoslavia, however, China has 
not made the transition to an industrialized, urban- 
ized society (80% of the population live in the rural 
areas) [25]. Whether such a transition is feasible or 
desirable for an underdeveloped country with a popu- 
lation which will reach 1300 million by the year 2000 
are dilemmas which still challenge the Communist 
leadership 1263. 
In this regard, the post-revolutionary period has 
been a time of political conflict over the appropriate 
path toward modernization. The tension between 
egalitarianism and material economic development 
has produced a rather ‘zig-zag’ pattern of national 
development policies. After 1949. the Chinese first 
adopted the Soviet model of highly centralized plan- 
rung and administration. Priority was given to indus- 
trial development, much to the detriment of the agri- 
cultural sector. Mao’s 1958 Great Leap Forward 
introduced decentralized administrative policies 
designed to promote industry und agriculture. Well- 
intentioned innovations in the organization of work 
and the use of non-material (moral) incentives to 
motivate work and political participation were ac- 
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companied by poor planning and a dramatic decline 
in productivity in all sectors [26]. This was followed 
by a period of moderation and retrenchment 
(1962-66) in which emphasis was placed on economic 
recovery over socialist organizational objectives. 
Then, in response to what was viewed as a retreat 
from socialism. Mao launched the chaotic IO-year 
Cultural Revolution in 1966. Economic development 
was once again subordinated to egalitarianism. 
Ostensibly, the Cultural Revolution was Mao’s effort 
to create a superstructure (i.e. educational, cultural 
and governmental institutions) more compatible with 
a socialist economic base. The severity of policies pur- 
sued to accomplish this resulted in such a decline in 
production and morale that those in power were 
overthrown after Mao’s death in 1976. China’s cur- 
rent leaders have since returned to more pragmatic, 
flexible economic policies. 
The basic socialist organizations in which all social, 
political and economic activities are conducted were 
gradually established during the first decade of Com- 
munist rule. In the countryside, however. the size of 
these collective work groups, as well as the basic level 
of accounting, have varied depending upon the par- 
ticular policy in vogue at the national level. Soon 
after the 1949 Revolution. peasants were grouped into 
mutual aid teams for production purposes. Agricui- 
tural cooperatives were formed within five years, and 
by 1958. all of rural China was organized into large 
communes of approx. 16,000 people. Each commune 
is under the administration of the county government 
and divided into brigades of around 1000 people. Bri- 
gades. in turn, are divided into production teams (cor- 
responding to one or more natural villages). These 
organizations of IO@200 persons have been the basic 
unit of work in the rural areas for the last 15 years. In 
the cities, people were assigned to state or collectively- 
owned enterprises. and also to neighborhood organiz- 
ations for the purposes of communication and con- 
trol. In many cases, the work unit and neighborhood 
coincide as larger enterprises house workers in their 
own dormitories. Most business, service and commer- 
cial enterprises were socialized by 1958 [26]. 
Despite shifts in political winds, decision-making in 
China has for the most part remained consistent with 
the phrase. ‘Democratic Centralism’. That is. planning 
proposals originate at the top and are circulated to 
appropriate lower levels for comment. with final de- 
cisions made by the central leadership. The imple- 
mentation of decisions is left to local leaders who are 
responsible to higher levels of authority. While the 
Chinese urban work units and rural brigades corre- 
spond structurally to the Yugoslav self-governing 
communes. their degree of actual autonomy in de- 
cision-making is far more limited. However. this can 
facilitate smoother central planning and coordination 
of the society. in general. and health services. in par-. 
titular. 
The orycirri:clriorl trfftl jffrrffciffy of hedtli sef-rices 
In pre-revolutionary China. a small number of 
Western-style medical centers. largely under the aus- 
pices of foreign missionary or philanthropic organiz- 
ations. provided services to the well-to-do population 
[27]. Most people. however. sought medical care from 
traditional practitioners or did without it. Since 1949. 
major efforts have been made to increase the accessi- 
bility of services to various sectors of the population. 
As a result of ideological and pragmatic policy de-, 
cisions, traditional Chinese medicine has been inte- 
grated into the Western-style medical care system at 
every level. Furthermore, as in Yugoslavia. the evofu- 
tion of the post-revolutionary health system in China 
has mirrored changing development policies. 
Thus, during the 1950s and, to a lesser extent, in the 
period following the Great Leap Forward, health ser- 
vice delivery was rather centralized and favored urban 
areas and industrial workers. In contrast, the Great 
Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution sought a 
more equitable distribution of health resources and 
produced experiments in the transfer of personnel and 
funds to the countryside to achieve this objective 
1241. 
Today, lines of referral in both rural and urban 
areas are fairly standardized. For the rural popula- 
tion. a decentralized network of health centers at the 
brigade level represents the first line of health care. 
These centers are staffed by ‘barefoot doctors’, and 
aided by auxiliary health workers in the production 
teams. ‘Barefoot doctors’ are paramedics trained for 
at least 6 months to conduct fundamental preventive 
and educational health work, treat minor conditions 
and refer more complicated cases to outpatient and 
inpatient facilities at the commune level. Recently, 
their role has been re-evaluated [ZS] and new pro- 
grams to upgrade their training and standardize the 
quality of care they dispense have been introduced 
[29]. The commune health facilities are staffed by 
physicians and other health personnel, and have 
departments for such specialities as medicine, surgery, 
obstetrics, gynecology and pediatrics [30]. When 
demed necessary, rural patients may be referred 
further to the better equipped and staffed county and 
district hospitals, or to designated urban referral hos- 
pitals Transfer to urban hospitals is rare, but does 
seem to occur more commonly for rural residents 
who live close to urban areas or who are seriously ill 
[31]. In the cities, primary care is provided in neigh- 
borhood and work unit clinics and in district or other 
city hospital outpatient departments. Like brigade 
health centers in the countryside, urban neighbor- 
hood and work unit clinics are usually staffed by para- 
medics who make referrals to physicians in hospitals 
and medical centers. Work unit clinics in large fac- 
tories or other enterprises may have physicians as 
well as paramedics and can thus provide more com- 
prehensive care to their employees. 
In addition to these established lines of patient 
referral, the Chinese have also institutionalized 
transfers of personnel between levels. On the one 
hand. physicians and nurses from the urban hospitals 
are often ‘sent down’ to the countryside to teach. do 
research and disease-prevention work as well as care 
for patients [32]. On the other hand, paraprofes- 
sionals and other health workers from the rural areas 
periodically receive training or continuing education 
at county or urban centers. In times of political 
emphasis on egalitarianism. this movement of person- 
nel was viewed as a major source of education for all 
involved. Furthermore, these policies reflect the lead- 
ership’s desire to de-professionalize medicine 
through the sharing of information with other health 
providers, Very recently, though, there has been a position of patients continue to be reflected in differ- 
shift away from this egalitarian policy. with emphasis ential access to care. 
now placed on the modernization of medicine Despite vigorous attempts to equalize accessibility. 
through development of high technologies and urban China’s rural peasant class remains at a distinct 
medical centers [28,31]. disadvantage. For one thing, the peasant must be 
In Yugoslavia, we have seen that direct state in- referred through more levels than urban dvvellers in 
volvement in the administration and financing of order to reach comparable health providers. Equally 
health care is limited. In contrast. the Chinese state important is the differential hospitalization insurance 
exercises greater control over the administration and plan which requires peasants and some workers to 
some of the financing of health care for its citizens. pay a portion of the costs. while state workers and 
For example, under the direction of the national Min- cadres are completely covered by their work units. 
istry of Health, each provincial Bureau of Health is Based on our observations [3l]. this appears to affect 
responsible for the assignment and salary of all staff the peasant’s decision to be hospitalized (particularly 
(with the exception of the rural barefoot doctors and for chronic illnesses or illness which is inevitably fatal). 
the urban neighborhood paramedics who are selected as well as decisions by hospital clinicians regarding 
by their respective brigade or unit and paid through length of stay and medications. Furthermore. the 
local funds). All job assignments, job descriptions, sal- rural patients are more likely to be treated with tra- 
ary scales and major management and capital invest- ditional medicine which remains popular in the 
ment decisions are made by the state. Private practice countryside and is less expensive than Western-style 
was phased out by 1958 [33]. although traditional medicine. Although some traditional procedures have 
practitioners have been allowed to practice outside shown themselves quite effective. the value of others 
the state system [34]. has yet to be carefully studied. Peasants are also at a 
One significant consequence of such centralized disadvantage with regard to the standard Chinese 
planning and administration is the relative lack of practice.for families to care for relatives in the hospi- 
autonomy of the physicians ois-&is administrators. tal (i.e. prepare meals, feed them. etc.). Whereas 
Physicians are government workers, employed on a workers and cadres are allowed time off with pay to 
fixed salary, with little input into administrative de- carry out these nursing tasks. peasants actually lose 
cisions and no other employment options [36]. The work points if they choose to care for hospitalized 
technical expertise which brings physicians power relatives. Finally, the relative disadvantage of the Chi- 
within health organizations in other societies [37] is nese peasantry is accentuated for those living in less 
not sufficient to balance the power of administrators prosperous communes. 
who control most other resources. This is particularly Urban workers and cadres, on the other hand. 
true if administrators are also Communist Party enjoy quicker access to the best medical centers in 
members [38]. China. Workers in large factories may be served by 
With regard to financing, the Chinese state assumes primary care clinics with general physicians and 
responsibility for a substantial portion of health care specialists before they even reach the hospitals. 
costs above the rural commune and urban neighbor- Workers and cadres are less constrained by hospital- 
hood and work unit levels. To illustrate. in the pro- ization costs. However, they, like the peasants. are 
vincial level hospital we studied [31], the state paid subject to the rules of the bureaucracy and the referral 
the health providers’ salaries, administrative costs, capi- network dictated by membership in their work unit. 
tal investment above $7000, building maintenance and One final issue in access is politics. In China’s 
occasional hospital bills which patients could not pay. recent past, political activities and history have been a 
Remaining health costs are financed through locally- source of differential access to health care. as well as 
administered health insurance funds which, as in other scarce goods and services. People judge to have 
Yugoslavia, are organized by occupation. In China, ‘bad’ class backgrounds or performance were denied 
most urban workers and cadres (state-employed pro- access to medical care in the more radical phases of 
fessionals and administrators) are fully insured for the Cultural Revolution. Even today, each urban hos- 
hospitalization and ordinary outpatient services as pital maintains a special ward for high-level officials 
part of their employment benefits. On the other hand, and veterans of the 1949 Revolution. Medical care on 
rural peasants. temporary workers and workers in these wards may not be substantially different. but the 
some collective enterprises (comprising over 80”,, of physical conditions are superior to those of other 
the total population) finance their health services wards. 
through local cooperative medical programs which 
rarely equal the breadth of coverage offered to state 
employees. Actual coverage for in- and outpatient ser- The putirnt-clinician relationship 
vices varies depending on the wealth of the brigade The patient-clinician relationship in China varies 
and commune, or the local enterprise, but was most with the type of clinician involved. It is worth empha- 
often quoted to us as 70”,, [3l]. sizing that the existence of more than one type of 
Guininy uc’c’ess ro cctrr 
clinician is. itself, a product of the Chinese sociopoliti- 
cal context. On the one hand. patients in rural and 
In a socialist country, particularly one in which a many urban settings are seen first by a barefoot doc- 
great effort has been made to decentralize delivery, tor or paramedic. These health providers are selected 
one might expect a minimum of inequities in access to from the patient population and continue in their 
health services. In fact, great strides have been made regular jobs as well as perform limited medical duties. 
in this direction in China. However. the organization Through close contact, patients are thus aware of 
of care and its financing and the differences in social both their limitations and skills. Furthermore thwr 
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local paramedics are subject to close supervision by 
physicians at the commune-level [30]. 
In contrast, the physician-patient relationship has 
a different tenor. Physicians did engage in manual 
labor during the Cultural Revolution alongside their 
patients, presumably to reduce the differences in 
status between them. This is no longer the case. 
Presently, the physician-patient relationship is in fact 
quite similar to that in Yugoslavia and, indeed, in 
most societies. According to our observations, 
patients are rarely given detailed explanations about 
their illness. the patient compliance is strongly re- 
warded [3 1,361. Added to the fact that physicians in 
China control so few resources which enhance pro- 
fessional power elsewhere (e.g. high prestige, high 
incomes), this observation suggests that the key vari- 
able which leads to such a hierarchical relationship 
between the clinician and patient is the control of 
medical information. 
The Chinese patient is fairly powerless, but still can 
marshal1 other resources when necessary. The 
patients’ families are encouraged to stay with their 
relatives and are often afforded more information and 
decision-making power than the patients. If a patient 
has a specific complaint. a second avenue of redress is 
through the patient’s work unit. A complaint can be 
lodged with the unit leader who will discuss the prob- 
lem with the appropriate physician or hospital leader. 
Not infrequently, the unit leader will take ani active 
interest in the physician’s decisions, and in such situ- 
ations may have an influence on the patient’s care. By 
so doing, the patient avoids any direct confrontation 
with the physician which might otherwise be inconsis- 
tent with the appropriate sick role. However. this 
strategy only works to the patient’s advantage if the 
unit leader is genuinely interested in the health care of 
his/her constituency. 
Like their Yugoslav counterparts, then. Chinese 
patients have developed ways to influence care includ- 
ing the use of relatives and work unit leaders as inter- 
mediaries. as well as the use of other ‘connections’ in 
the health system. According to our observations, 
though. outright gift-giving occurred in the case of 
traditional practitioners rather than in the hospital 
setting [36]. Finally. patients may seek health care 
outside the designated referral route, but will be reim- 
bursed only if approved by clinic personnel in the 
work unit. Although these rules reduce ‘doctor shop- 
ping’ by making it an expensive personal maneuver, 
they leave the patlent and his or her unit a variety of 
health care alternatives. 
DISCUSSION 
As largely agrarian and underdeveloped countries. 
Yugoslavia and China both confronted major prob- 
lems of development when they emerged as socialist 
states in the mid-twentieth century. After rejecting 
the Soviet model of planning and administrhtion. 
each embarked on its own path to socialism based on 
its unique interpretation of Marxist ideology and 
pragmatic considerations. While the Chinese have 
opted for a highly centralized. state-controlled econ- 
omy. the Yugoslavs have attempted to reduce the role 
of centralized state administration and allow a freer 
play of market forces. However. we might add here 
that very recent developments in China (e.g. the for- 
mation of work councils, experiments with various 
forms of self-management in industrial enterprises, 
and incipient forms of private enterprise) show 
remarkable similarities to the Yugoslav model. 
With the common ideological objective to make 
health care available to all, the two countries have 
created somewhat different health care systems. In 
China, a centralized administration coordinates devel- 
opment and integrates the various levels of health 
care delivery. Apart from medical matters, physicians 
have relatively little control over the social and econ- 
omic conditions of their work (e.g. practice sites, 
salaries). There have been concerted efforts to de-pro- 
fessionalize medicine by sharing information with 
‘other health workers and through continued reliance 
on traditional practitioners. In Yugoslavia, on the 
other hand. decentralization and self-management 
have meant somewhat greater autonomy for health 
workers to control their working conditions (of 
course, within the boundaries of a socialized health 
sector). Physicians retain their dominant positions in 
health institutions, and priority has consistently been 
given to increasing the supply of these ur.iversity- 
trained health professionals rather than development 
of paraprofessionals like the Chinese barefoot doctors 
or Russian feldshers. 
Both Yugoslavia and China have made consider- 
able progress relative to their predecessors in improv- 
ing the accessibility of health care to their respective 
populations. Yet, neither has succeeded in overcom- 
ing inequalities inherited from the pre-revolutionary 
regimes or associated with priorities set in the course 
of socialist development. Regardless of the sociopoliti- 
cal system, tough decisions must be made in allocat- 
ing scarce (medical) resources. And, in both Yugosla- 
via and China, these decisions have tended to favor 
urban industrial workers at the expense of the rural 
population. 
Finally, despite differences in the sociopolitical con- 
text and organization of health services, there are 
nonetheless similarities in the patient-physician re- 
lationship. In both countries, the power of the phys- 
ician ris-&vis the patient has resisted encroachment. 
Whether the physician has some autonomy to nego- 
tiate the social and economic terms of his/her work 
(as in Yugoslavia) or occupies a carefully prescribed 
bureaucratic position (as in China), the relationship 
between physician and patient is still hierarchical. We 
would argue that this is due to physicians’ continued 
monopoly on medical information. Nevertheless, 
patients in each country have devised strategies (e.g. 
bribes. intermediaries. connections) to exert some 
measure of control in the medical encounter. 
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